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eaching the top, the theme 
of this conference, seems like an 
excellent goal. Still, it is useful 
to consider more carefully what 
constitutes the top and in which 
direction the top lies. “Up” is 
perhaps the obvious answer. 
But as any mountaineer can tell 
you, the path to the summit of-
ten winds around many smaller 
peaks.  Or,  in  mathematical 
terms (the preferred currency 
of the economics profession), a 
local maximum is not necessar-
ily a global maximum. 
It may seem implausible to 
many  highly  skilled  profes-
sionals that aspirations to top 
management in a Fortune 500 
company could represent less 
than a global maximum. But 
that is the conclusion to which 
this article leads. Although ex-
isting organizational and cul-
tural practices have the beneﬁt 
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of creating incentives to increase output, they may also create 
perverse incentives that have negative economic effects outside 
the relatively easily measured world of market outcomes. 
I was asked to address two questions: Do existing organiza-
tional and cultural practices have a productivity payoff? And, 
does the status quo reduce national production and income? 
The answers depend entirely on how national production and 
income are deﬁned. Efforts to assign a monetary value to non-
market activities, such as child care, volunteer work, and, more 
broadly, the intrinsic value of human capabilities, profoundly 
modify our economic accounts. Thus, while it is important to 
ask how to improve women’s chances of success within our 
current institutional environment, my goal is different. I ar-
gue that women should play a leadership role in redeﬁning our 
measures of success. 
The impact of gender norms
In Liar’s Poker, his vivid account of working for Salomon 
Brothers in the 1980s, Michael Lewis describes the challenges 
facing a new employee who is handed a pair of telephones on 
the trading ﬂoor: “If he would make millions of dollars come 
out of those phones, he became that most revered of all species, 
a Big Swinging Dick.” Everybody wanted to be a Big Swinging 
Dick, Lewis explains, “even the women.” Yet, his next anec-
dote details the humiliation of a female trainee. 
In management, as in other ﬁelds, considerable debate 
centers on the similarities and differences between men and 
women. It is an irritating debate, sometimes making us feel 
as though we are being boiled down to a binary gender assig-
nation. Few of us want to choose between simplistic me-too-
ism (“Girls can do anything boys can do”) and sarcastic self- 
righteousness (“Women who want to be like men lack ambi-
tion”). The debate becomes more interesting if we back off 
from simple polarity, acknowledge a multidimensional con-
tinuum between masculinity and femininity, and ask how we 
might be nudged in different directions along it, and why. 
Femininity and masculinity are rather abstract concepts. 
And they certainly may change over time. But in the short run, 
one way they are reinforced is through the labor and dating 
markets, where those who don’t conform may pay a penalty. 
In research on labor market outcomes for gays, lesbians, and 
heterosexual counterparts with similar levels of education and 
experience, my colleague Lee Badgett learned that while gay 
men pay a wage penalty, lesbian women seem to enjoy a slight 
wage advantage. They seem to be more willing than hetero-
sexual women to enter nontraditional occupations (gay men 
likewise, but nontraditional occupations for men generally 
promise lower, not higher earnings). 
One reason: a nontraditional occupation may impose costs 
in the dating and marriage market. Austrian economist Doris 
Weichselbaumer conducted an interesting experiment using 
the personal ads published in a free newspaper in western Mas-
sachusetts. She placed ads by two ﬁctional white females who 
differed only in the gender conformity of their occupation, one 
a nurse, the other an electrician: 
SWF, 31, good looking, slender nurse. Enjoys x-country skiing and 
ﬁlms. Financially stable. Would like to meet a man for a lasting re-
lationship.
SWF, slim, attractive, electrician, 30, ﬁnancially stable, likes movies 
and rollerblading, seeks man for lasting relationship. 
The ads ran for ﬁve weeks. The nurse received 77 responses, 
the electrician 39. Apparently, violating gender norms has some 
negative consequences in the dating market.
Badgett and I explored this further by asking groups of col-
lege students to rate 10 similar personal vignettes that randomly 
varied characteristics such as occupation. We found that (con-
trolling for status, education, and other factors) a woman in a 
gender-nonconforming occupation is likely to face a reduced 
pool of potential suitors. The penalties for women are lower 
in nontraditional jobs that require substantial education or 
offer relatively high status—a female orthopedic surgeon, for 
instance, is penalized less than a female electrician. Men in 
gender-atypical occupations are also considered less attrac-
tive—but their earnings power matters more than their gender 
conformity. 
This suggests that men who invest in market-oriented 
Women who enter “male” occupations enjoy a positive payo� in the labor 
market, but may ﬁnd themselves at a disadvantage in the dating market
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human capital enjoy two positive payoffs—one in the labor 
market and one in the dating market. Women enjoy a posi-
tive payoff in the labor market if they enter an “unfeminine” 
occupation (though it may be decreased by discrimination), 
but their payoff in the dating market is much reduced. It is as 
though men are competing in two races that require similar 
training (e.g., the general aerobic conditioning that contributes 
to success in running a 15K race and a marathon), while women 
are competing in two races that require different training (e.g., 
a sprinter’s 100 yard dash and a marathon). It is no wonder that 
we describe women who combine family and highly successful 
careers as “superwomen.” 
Public policies to promote better work-family balance might 
make it easier for these women to succeed. But our research 
suggests that the gender inequality we observe may have deep-
er sources than the absence of paid maternity leave, or limits to 
the length of the working day. It may also stem in part from cul-
tural norms of masculinity and femininity that place women at 
a disadvantage. And it is difﬁ  cult to explain why women would 
conform to such costly norms without looking more closely at 
possible differences in men’s and women’s preferences. 
Gender and preferences
Economists tend to sidestep questions about preferences. Yet, 
common sense suggests not only that it is harder for women 
than for men to “have it all,” but also that women may want 
more than men to “have it all.” Thus, it is worth considering the 
possibility that when it comes to children, women have more 
expensive preferences than men. 
Such a hypothesis is consistent with a number of the insights 
of evolutionary biology. Differences in the size and quantity of 
gametes produced by males and females, combined with the 
physiological cost of carrying, nursing, and nurturing children, 
have signiﬁ  cant implications for the way preferences may have 
evolved. Mothers have invested more in individual offspring 
and have more to lose (in terms of the long-term survival pros-
pects of their genes) from the loss of a child than fathers. Simi-
larly, women lose their reproductive capacity at a younger age 
than men, and mothers bond more closely and more quickly 
with offspring than do fathers. Thus, fathers are in a stronger 
position than mothers to credibly threaten to abandon their 
children.
A different set of evolutionary pressures operates on males 
and females. Natural selection rewards males who improve their 
mating effort by increasing their sexual access to females. It re-
wards females who increase their parenting effort by improving 
the likelihood that their children will reach maturity, including 
bargaining with males for greater support of children. In other 
words, many centuries of evolution may have favored females 
who are more willing than males to sacriﬁ  ce some of their own 
consumption and leisure on behalf of their children. 
These evolutionary pressures may also have implications for 
The battle to measure and value nonmarket work has 
a long and fascinating history, punctuated by protests 
from women’s groups. My favorite example is a letter 
sent to Congress by the Association for the Advance-
ment of Women in 1878, complaining of the Census 
Bureau’s failure to acknowledge the productive value 
of the home and woman as home-keeper. The letter 
failed to sway federal legislators, but presented a 
point of view shared by the Massachusetts Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, which began collecting data in 1865 
on the number of adults engaged primarily in house-
work. A few men (less than 1 percent) fell into this 
category, and the small number of married women 
who engaged in neither paid nor unpaid work were 
categorized as “wives, merely ornamental.” 
The English economist Alfred Marshall advised 
census-takers in Britain to adopt the practice of 
terming married women “dependents” and exclud-
ing them from estimates of the labor force, because 
this would make Britain appear to be more produc-
tive. Despite shifts to this terminology, early national 
income accountants tended to argue that household 
services represented productive work. In 1921, the 
National Bureau of Economic Research published a 
landmark study of income in the United States that 
calculated the value of household services based on 
estimates of the number of women ages 16+ primarily 
engaged in housework without monetary remunera-
tion. Assuming that the proportion of “housewives” 
to the total population remained constant, and that 
the average value of their services in 1909 was about 
equal to the average income of persons engaged in 
the paid occupation of Domestic and Personal Service, 
they calculated that the value of housewives’ services 
amounted to 31 percent of market national income in 
1909 and 25 percent in 1918.
Within universities, the emerging ﬁ  eld of “home 
economics” created a platform for research on such 
topics. The ﬁ  rst surveys in the United States that 
used time diaries were administered to small sam-
ples of farm wives in the 1920s. National income 
accounting, however, moved in a di�  erent direction. 
The economist A.C. Pigou insisted that national in-
come should be deﬁ  ned only in terms of goods and 
services that could be brought “directly or indirectly 
into relation with the measuring rod of money,” and 
discouraged the application of such a measuring rod 
to household work. 
In the early 1930s, two women economists pub-
lished comprehensive studies of the economics of 
household production. But it was not until the 1990s, 
under pressure from women’s groups, that most 
countries moved toward making serious e�  orts to 
measure the value of nonmarket work.
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the broader development of male and female capabilities and 
preferences. Physical strength becomes an advantage for males 
in competition with other males. Selection for mating effort 
tends to place males in “winner-take-all” games that reward 
risk-taking behavior. If they fail to mate, helping to nurture 
offspring becomes irrelevant. Selection for parental effort places 
females in strategic environments more likely to reward coop-
eration. Unlike men who face a shortage of potential partners, 
women face substantial long-term risks of being unable to raise 
children to maturity. As a result, men and women may have 
evolved propensities to behave somewhat differently even with 
similar environments. 
This concept of gendered preferences is also consistent with 
experimental evidence. In carefully controlled laboratory set-
tings in which participants play games with real money pay-
offs, women behave in more generous and more risk-averse 
ways than men. Women are particularly cooperative when 
paired with another woman. Other experiments that compare 
the productivity of men and women under different systems 
of compensation (piece rates, competition in which only the 
relative position matters—that is, the winner enjoys a large pre-
mium while the loser receives little) ﬁnd that men and women 
are about equally productive under a piece-rate system, but 
that men try harder and are more productive if payments are 
competitive, perhaps as a result of greater conﬁdence in their 
potential success.
Many more experiments of this type will be required to per-
suade me that these differences are truly important in explain-
ing daily life. But I am intrigued by the thought experiment. 
What if it were true that women tended to be less competi-
tive than men? Should we try to change our preferences (and 
those of our daughters) and not just try to behave but also to 
feel more like men? Or would society lose something impor-
tant—including a chance to reconsider the role of competition 
in the economy?
Too much competition?
In the world of neoclassical economics, competition rewards 
those who successfully pursue their own self-interest. At the 
macro level, everyone beneﬁts from the increased output that 
results from the alignment of incentives and rewards. Com-
petition is generally viewed in the same short-run terms as 
what evolutionary biologists describe as male preoccupation 
with “mating success.” It is often remote from the longer-run 
beneﬁts of rearing the next generation, or what evolutionary 
biologists describe as “parenting success.” 
While competitive pressure is a useful device for encourag-
ing positive economic outcomes, I would like to suggest that 
more competitive pressure is not always better. Rather, the rela-
tionship between competitive pressure and positive economic 
outcomes may be positive up to a point, but after that the costs 
may outweigh the beneﬁts. Moreover, there is little reason to 
believe that our current economic institutions situate us at the 
right level. Indeed, while other economic systems may suffer 
from insufﬁcient competition, we may suffer from too much. 
Thomas Schelling, a great innovator in strategic modeling, 
was fond of what he called the “inexorable mathematics of mu-
sical chairs” as a way of exploring and understanding the rela-
tionship between intensity of competition and economic out-
comes. In musical chairs, individuals parade around a group 
of chairs as music plays. When the music stops, they must sit 
in a chair. Those who fail are eliminated from the game; but 
for every person eliminated, a chair is also removed. In the ﬁnal 
round, two persons compete for a single chair. 
Imagine that individuals are doing something economically 
productive rather than simply parading to music. The competi-
tive structure of the game urges them to pay close attention and 
try as hard as they can to grab a chair when the music stops, 
subject to the requirements of common courtesy. The intensity 
of the competition is determined partly by the number of play-
ers relative to the number of chairs, and partly by the cost of 
losing. When the stakes are low, the game is lighthearted. But if 
those who grab chairs are guaranteed lifetime job security while 
the others are relegated permanently to the unemployment line, 
the competition can become intense. 
Increasing the number of competitors and the relative level 
of the reward does not always lead to more positive economic 
outcomes. It is not difﬁcult to imagine a situation in which, 
if the stakes became too high, individuals would be tempted 
to violate common courtesy and engage in kicking, shoving, 
pinching, and eye-gouging. One can even imagine embittered 
players strapping on explosives in order to blow up the chairs. 
Much depends on how effectively the rules and civility of the 
game can be enforced. But holding these constant, increasing 
the intensity of competition is likely at some point to lead to 
declining beneﬁts, perhaps even to costs.
One real-world example is in the use of steroids and other 
performance-enhancing drugs in competitive sports. Such 
drugs pose serious long-term but uncertain health risks, yet 
the short-run pressures to use them are enormous—as are the 
rewards of winning. Without regulation and strict enforcement 
of rules, drug use can become endemic with an increase in the 
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attendant health risks to all players—even as the fact that ev-
eryone is using them neutralizes the competitive beneﬁt any 
one person would have achieved.
In the modern economy, Robert Frank offers a compelling 
account in which information technology has increased the 
prevalence of high stakes, winner-take-all tournaments—and 
the adverse consequences that can arise from them. He notes 
that the tendency of people to evaluate their welfare in relative 
terms and to overestimate their chances of success in competi-
tion results in people allocating more effort to winning than is 
justiﬁed by the potential social beneﬁts. Frank urges us to think 
less about individual performance within a given competitive 
game, and more about the design of the game itself.
Bringing the discussion back to the subject of this confer-
ence, many high-paying professional careers, including those 
of managers, lawyers, and top-level academics, are conducted 
like winner-take-all tournaments. As a result, both men and 
women often face a high price for devoting time to family and 
community, even if they have legal access to parental or family 
leave. As Tipper and Al Gore put it, “At any given moment 
when the decision between work and family must be made, 
the workplace has a much stronger ability to quantify and ex-
press the immediate cost of neglecting work.” Like resorting 
to steroids, working long hours is a competitive strategy that 
offers no individual advantage if everyone adopts it. And it can 
lead to a serious misallocation of time away from family and 
community. 
Another example of the negative impact of excessive compe-
tition comes from the corporate accounting scandals of the last 
few years. Forms of executive compensation that were thought 
to represent “optimal contracts” proved distinctly suboptimal 
because they encouraged cheating and opportunism. Although 
I know of no systematic analysis of gender differences in such 
behavior, it has been noted that women were well represented 
among the key whistle-blowers. At the same time, women who 
engaged in suspicious behavior were generally held to a higher 
standard and were subject to more public criticism than men. 
Martha Stewart is the classic example—last year she appeared 
on the cover of Atlantic Monthly as a witch being burned at 
the stake.
The care sector
The optimal level of competitive pressure may vary in different 
economic contexts. It is probably lowest in the traditionally 
feminine “care sector” of the economy that includes the paid 
and unpaid work of caring for dependents, and highest in the 
more traditionally masculine “physical output” sector of the 
economy where goods are easily substitutable, and quantity 
and quality are more easily measured and monitored. In ad-
dition, some types of work, such as child care, nursing, and 
teaching, have intrinsic characteristics that make it difﬁcult to 
rely on competition as a motivational device. 
Empirical research could also help clarify the different effects 
of competitive pressure. It could reveal differences in propensi-
ties to violate the “rules of the game” and how they are affected 
by factors such as consumer choice, institutional transparency, 
monitoring costs, substitutability of inputs, and measurement 
of output. 
For all the media attention devoted to corporate scandal, 
there has been remarkably little focus on such questions as 
who bears the costs when cheating and malfeasance become 
endemic. Any infractions of the rules, such as those governing 
“...when the decision between work and family must be made, the workplace has a 
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insider trading or mutual fund transactions, undermines inves-
tor conﬁdence. But the costs are almost certainly higher when 
large numbers of workers and consumers are adversely affected. 
In this area, the poster child for misbehavior is not Enron, or 
Putnam, but Tenet Healthcare, the nation’s second-largest for-
proﬁt hospital chain: In 1997, following a chain of lawsuits in 
which they admitted to defrauding both insurance companies 
and the federal government, Tenet agreed to pay $100 million 
to about 700 former patients for illegally imprisoning them in 
psychiatric hospitals to obtain their insurance beneﬁts.
If consumers know what they want, have perfect informa-
tion, have adequate economic resources (or opportunities to 
acquire them), and are offered a range of choices, they can be 
expected to make the best decisions for themselves. But in sec-
tors of the economy such as health, education, and nursing 
homes, these conditions are very hard to deliver. The problem 
is not lack of information, but its excess and complexity. And 
many consumers in the care sector are too sick, young, feeble, 
powerless, or poor to effectively evaluate their choices.
Even beyond issues of information and consumer choice, 
there is another question: Can we measure the outcomes that 
matter? The process of caring for dependents has complex 
emotional and personal dimensions, and includes many non-
cognitive inputs and outputs that are difﬁcult to quantify. The 
job of a health-care provider is not merely to cure an illness, 
but also to promote health. The job of a teacher is not merely 
to improve test scores, but also to encourage a love of learn-
ing. The job of an elder-care worker is not merely to prevent 
bedsores, but also to make patients feel cared for. Incentives 
to improve performance in the measurable dimensions of these 
tasks can have the effect of reallocating effort away from those 
that are less easily measured. 
Along similar lines, the care sector of the economy encom-
passes unpaid work in the home. Much of this could be re-
placed by the purchase of services—housekeepers, gardeners, 
nannies—with wages determined by the forces of supply and 
demand in competitive markets. But hired help do not typi-
cally provide good substitutes for personal commitments and 
family-speciﬁc skills. 
Social scientists have been known to suggest that parent-
ing could be rationalized and made more efﬁcient by offering 
self-interested incentives. James Coleman argues that parents 
should enjoy a public reward based on a calculation of how 
much better their children perform than might be expected 
based on their objective characteristics. Shirley Burggraf ar-
gues that instead of taxing the younger generation as a whole 
to support the elderly, we should give parents a legal claim to a 
percentage of their children’s earnings. Would daughters then 
become less desirable than sons, because they earn less? 
Apart from the pathology of thinking about children in such 
instrumental terms, the “quality” of children cannot be reduced 
to measures of their future earnings. Families don’t merely pro-
duce “human capital.” They also produce human capabilities 
of much greater and more intangible worth. Every child is 
helplessly and powerfully unique. As the Texas populist Jim 
Hightower puts it, “It’s easier to count the seeds in the apple 
than the apples in the seed.” 
All these factors are relevant to a consideration of the optimal 
level of competitive pressure in the economy and to efforts to 
derive better estimates of the value of care services provided 
outside the market. 
Accounting for care
National income accountants don’t get nearly as much scru-
tiny as corporate accountants these days. One could argue that 
national accounts matter less, because they are not informing 
decisions to buy and sell. But political regimes compete on 
the basis of certain measures, among them the rate of growth 
of GDP. And national income accounts provide basic bench-
marks for the measurement of economic success. 
But these measures of economic success exclude consider-
ation of the value of nonmarket work. Imagine a corporation or 
a nonproﬁt ﬁrm that beneﬁts from a large supply of volunteer 
More competitive pressure is not always better; and while other economic systems 
may su�er from insu�cient economic competition, we may su�er from too much
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labor. If the supply of this volunteer labor changes over time, it 
is altering the relationship between priced inputs and outputs. 
This is why many organizations treat volunteer labor as an in-
kind contribution and estimate its cost. 
The movement of women into paid employment is one of the 
most signiﬁcant trends of the twentieth century. When women 
reallocate their time and energy from home and family care to 
paid employment, they move from traditionally unmeasured 
into measured activities. This movement across the accounting 
boundaries probably overstates the rate of economic growth 
and misrepresents levels of economic welfare. Many countries, 
including the United States, are developing additions to their 
conventional national accounts to address this problem. These 
are termed “satellite” accounts because they are added onto the 
existing accounts, which remain intact. 
The strategy adopted by most countries for measuring non-
market work is to measure the inputs of time, using time-diary 
surveys of a representative sample of the population. Then the 
inputs of time are multiplied by the wage that would be paid 
if someone were hired to do work of comparable quality, or al-
ternatively by the wage the person providing the service would 
have received in his or her market profession. Results from 
Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
States show that, even when using the ﬁrst method, nonmarket 
activities account for a sizeable proportion (between 40 percent 
and 60 percent) of the value of all output. 
Yet, a number of thorny measurement and conceptual prob-
lems remain. I have had the honor of participating on a panel 
convened by the National Academy of Sciences to consider 
how best to assign a value to nonmarket work and health. In 
general, we found it easy to agree on methods of valuing non-
market work that have obvious market substitutes, such as 
cooking and cleaning. More serious problems emerge in con-
sideration of more personal forms of work, such as family care. 
For instance, time-use diaries capture the activity of caring for 
children better than the more diffuse responsibilities for child 
care, which often constrain parents’ activities. 
But these problems (though daunting) are small compared to 
more conceptual ones. Time devoted to the care of children and 
other dependents can be treated simply as a form of “consump-
tion” and valued at what it would cost to hire someone else to 
provide the service. But as the metaphor of “investment in hu-
man capital” suggests, we could also value the activity from the 
other direction—measuring the net present discounted ﬂow of 
services from the capital asset. 
Who produces human capital?
Despite widespread rhetorical use of the term “human capi-
tal,” economists continue to interpret it narrowly. It is often 
assumed that the actual physical production of children, along 
with their early nurturance, is not an economic activity and only 
formal education counts as an investment in human capital. 
Yet a growing literature documents the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of 
early childhood experiences on both motivation and the acqui-
sition of cognitive skills later in life. 
In addition, economists typically estimate the value of hu-
man capital as the net present discounted value of future life-
time earnings—even though the services that children provide 
cannot be reduced to earnings. After all, by this measure, a 
daughter is worth less than a son, and neither Jesus nor Van 
Gogh was worth much, since they enjoyed no commercial suc-
cess in their lifetimes. The capabilities that children develop 
have profound implications for our own sense of fulﬁllment, for 
our ability to govern ourselves, and for our ability to respond 
to the unforeseen challenges of the future. In technical terms, 
they have many “spillover” effects, “externalities” that are not 
captured by market valuation. 
I have long argued that our public policies redistribute re-
sources from parents in general (and mothers in particular) to 
nonparents. We have “socialized” the economic beneﬁts of 
childrearing more extensively than we have socialized the costs. 
Fertility decline has provided important economic beneﬁts. But 
reductions in the time and energy devoted to the next genera-
tion, like competitive pressure (and perhaps as a result of it), 
can go too far. 
Conclusion
Women may have different norms and preferences than men 
because we have had different responsibilities—differences 
that may be based to some extent in biology as well as culture. 
We have attained the power to change both biology and cul-
ture, along with the very meaning of femininity. And we have 
changed that meaning, for the most part, in positive ways. But 
in doing so, we may have entered a game in which we are of-
fered a choice between adopting traditionally masculine priori-
ties and being denied access to the “top.” If we focus too nar-
rowly on the optimal strategy of individual choice, we will lose 
our collective opportunity to change the rules of the game. 
Rather, we need to develop ways of controlling competitive 
pressures in the economy lest they weaken families, communi-
ties, and the long-run sustainability of our economy and society 
as a whole. We need to think more carefully about the insti-
tutional organization of the paid care sector of the economy, 
providing more guarantees of high-quality care for children, 
the sick, and the elderly. And we need to move beyond the mar-
gins of conventional economic theory to develop better social 
accounting systems. If we don’t, we may reach the top of the 
mountain only to see it crumble beneath us. S
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